The Chinese Conceptions of Law: Confucian, Legalist, and Buddhist by Lee, Luke T. & Lai, Whalen W.
Hastings Law Journal
Volume 29 | Issue 6 Article 3
1-1978




Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Law Journal by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Luke T. Lee and Whalen W. Lai, The Chinese Conceptions of Law: Confucian, Legalist, and Buddhist, 29 Hastings L.J. 1307 (1978).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_law_journal/vol29/iss6/3
The Chinese Conceptions of Law:
Confucian, Legalist, and Buddhist
By LuKx T. LE*
WHALEN W. LAi**
Introduction
P HREE PHILOSOPHICAL traditions affecting the legal sys-
tems in China stand out in clear relief: the Confucian,
the Legalist, and the Buddhist. Although the legal system
in China grew out of the thoughts of the Legalists, who helped found
the first empire, Chin (221-206 B.C.), under Han, the immediately
following dynasty (207 B.C.-220 A.D.), a Confucian-Legalist syn-
thesis was struck. The only other independent concept of "law" in
any sense of the word belonged to the Buddhist establishment. The
major Chinese traditions may be characterized in terms of their con-
ceptions of law, man, and the cosmos as follows: the Legalist be-
lieves in man, or rather, the king, as the agent in the creation of law;
the Confucian trusts in the natural harmony between man's ritual
propriety and the natural principles of the universe; and the Buddhist
believes in the sacred transcendental law, with a historical but super-
human origin in the teachings of one man-the Buddha. Because
much has already been written on the Confucian-Legalist traditions,
this Article will only briefly summarize them, devoting the main dis-
cussion to an examination of the Buddhist conception of law and to
the impact of the various religious traditions upon the current Chinese
state.
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There is a widespread belief that Chinese law is not "law" in
the Western sense at all. Escarra, the French jurist, once remarked,
"Where it is anything else but a fiction, the opposition traditionally
established between Orient and Occident is met nowhere more clear-
ly than in the domain of law."1 He went on to contrast the Confu-
cian society of China with Western civilization, dominated by the
Greco-Roman conception of law carried along with the spread of
Christianity.2 The Westerner, according to Escarra, views the law
as almost sacrosanct, as the regulator of the social conduct of all
people. In contrast, the Chinese traditionally hold the law in low
esteem.
3
Even in the West, however, law is defined many ways. The
Austinian definition of law is a command, prescribed or dictated by
a superior, which an inferior is bound to obey under threat of pun-
ishment. Eugen Ehrlich, on the other hand, discusses the "living
law of the people." Under that concept legal regulation and en-
forcement based on the political state are only a fraction, albeit an
increasing fraction, of the sum total of this living law, the balance
being comprised of norms which result from the influence of family,
religion, and other social organizations and associations.4  The Chi-
nese equivalents of these two approaches to law are fa and li, terms
representing a conceptual dichotomy which is traditional in China.
Li-translated variously as propriety, ethics, or moral rules of correct
conduct and good manners-embodies chiefly the teaching of Con-
fucius, in particular the "five relations": ruler and subject, father and
son, husband and wife, elder and younger brother, and friend and
friend. Liki (The Book of Li) describes 1i as "a regulator of human
desires that has been devised for the protection of the people.":
It is a form of social control over unrestrained expression of human
desires. It "forbids trespasses before they are committed, whereas
1. ESCARRA, LE DDOIT CHINOIS 9 (C. Browne trans., reproduced by Harvard Lax%
School 1961) [hereinafter cited as ESCARRA].
2. Id. at 10.
3. Id. at 11.
4. E. EHIRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAW 373, 493
(1936).
5. Li and Law, 2 CHINESE CULTURE No. 4, at 4 (Chang Chin-tsen, trans. 1960).
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fa punishes criminal acts after their commission."6 Li is closely re-
lated to tao, the natural order, and this emphasis on moral rules and
natural order is not unlike the emphasis on natural law in the West,
7
which is frequently concerned with the problem of how actuality is
related to the normative order.8
Fa, although it has been translated as "law," is actually much
narrower in scope. It is chiefly associated with the Legalist school
of Han Fei-tze, which reached its zenith in the despotic Chin dy-
nasty during the Third Century B.C. The Legalists rely on the
force of sanctions to obtain obedience to and compliance with the
law, and therefore they stress government by fa or decree, as op-
posed to the Confucian emphasis on government by man and li.
The Legalists insist on complete equality before fa, as opposed to
the Confucian acknowledgment of the inequality of people. The
Legalists enforce objective and unvarying rules of conduct, in con-
trast to the Confucian acceptance of different rules for different re-
lations and positions. Although the Chin dynasty was short-lived,
Legalist thought continued to influence subsequent dynasties, as evi-
denced by centralized bureaucracies and official codes.
If one discards 1i and identifies only fa with "law," using the
criteria of codification and enforcement by government authorities,
one must reject, for example, the validity of customary international
law because it lacks these qualities. Although 1i does not fulfill
Austin's definition of law, it certainly fits into the broader definition
of law given by Ehrlich. In fact, 1i can be described as a code en-
forced by society rather than by government. 9 Li and fa were com-
mingled in the T'ang Code, which provided: "That which deviates
from 'i' comes within the competence of legal penalties. Violations
of 1i are subject to punishment."10 In the Code of Law drawn up
by Prime Minister Hsiao Ho and in the Court Ceremonials formulated
by Shu Sun Tung, 1i and fa were made to coordinate and complement
each other, a principle which was to endure 2,100 years to the present
century."l
6. Id.
7. See 2 NEEDHAM, SCIENCE AND CIVILIZATION IN CHINA 544 (1956).
8. Schwartz, On Attitudes Towards Law in China, in GOVERNMENT UNDER LAW
AND THE INDIVmUAL 29 (1957).
9. See, e.g., Address by Franz H. Michael, American Society of International Law
Pacific Northwestern Regional Meeting (Spring 1961).
10. Li and Law, 2 CHINESE CULTURE No. 4, at 15 (Chang Chin-tsen, trans. 1960).
11. Id. at 13.
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Even Confucius did not totally reject the role of fa.12  Li com-
prehends fa as one facet of the law, even though the converse is not
true. If Ehrlich's definition of law is accepted, Wigmore was cor-
rect when he said in 1935 that the Chinese legal system is "the only
one that has survived continuously to date-a period of more than
4,000 years; in comparison, the other living systems of today are but
children."13
In any conflict between 1i and fa, traditional Chinese society
preferred li. The reason for this resolution was eloquently explained
by Confucius:
If the people are guided by fa, and order among them is enforced
by means of punishment, they will try to evade the punishment,
but have no sense of shame, but if they are guided by virtue,
and order among them is enforced by li, they will have the sense
of shame and also be reformed. 14
Confucius noted the value of this system when he said: "As a judge,
I decide disputes, for that is my duty; but the best thing that could
happen would- be to eliminate the causes for litigation. '' 5 In fact,
the highest ideal of chiin-tze (gentleman) is to show oneself capable
of exact proportions and moderation in all circumstances. Compro-
mise or yielding with propriety is always far more important in China
than invoking personal rights and privileges.
Li traditionally dominated not merely domestic society but also
interstate relations. For example, in one instance Confucius praised
the action of the Marquis of Ch'i, a leader of a league, in convening
a congress of states to conclude a new league in 651 B.C. and thus
uniting the lords by peaceful means instead of military force.' 6 In
another instance, the Duke of Hsiiang and the Marquis of Ch'i tried
to reconcile a conflict between the states of Ch'ii and T'an. The
people of Ch'ii were unwilling to be reconciled, and so the Duke in-
vaded Ch'ii and took the city of Hsiang. The classic history, Tso
Chuan condemned the Duke's act as not being in accord with 1i:
12. Id. at 14.
13. C. WIGMORE, PANORAMA OF THE WORLD'S LEGAL SYSTEM 141 (1936).
14. CONFUCIAN ANALECTS, bk. II, ch. III.
15. Confucius, The Great Learning, ch. IV.
16. The event was recorded in Tso Chuan as follows: "They assembled at K'wei-
ch'iu to renew the league and to cultivate the good relations among the princes them-
selves; which was proper." Duke Hsi, bk. V, yr. IX, in 5 CHINESE CLASSICS 154 (2d
ed. J. Legge 1966) [hereinafter cited as CHINESE CLASSICS].
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States must be reconciled by the rules of propriety, and not by
disorder. To attack Ch'U, without regulating [the differences by
those rules] was creating disorder. By disorder [sic] to attempt
to reconcile disorder, [it] left no room for the [proper] regula-
tion; and without such regulation, how could any rule of propriety
be carried out?
17
In another historical episode, the powerful state of Tsin, upon
defeating the state of Cheng, tried to impose a harsh peace settle-
ment. Cheng protested that peace terms should be based on 1i and
should not be imposed arbitrarily. Tsin conceded the propriety of
this claim, acknowledging that a coerced settlement would be con-
trary to li. Tso Chuan noted the statement from a Tsin leader:
We indeed have not virtue, and it is not proper to force men to
covenant with us. Without propriety, how can we preside our
covenants? ... If we are without virtue, other people will cast
us off, and not Cheng only; if we can rest and be harmonious,
they will come to us from a distance.18
Accordingly, Tsin agreed to a revision of the terms and withdrew
its forces.
Above all, ii is concerned with sincerity (ch'eng) and trustwor-
thiness (hsin), for which Western legal equivalents are good faith
and Pacta sunt servanda. The concepts of ch'eng and hsin are ex-
tensions of the Confucian concept of the proper relationship between
friend and friend. Mencius, a Chinese thinker, said: "Between
father and son, there should be affection; between sovereign and sub-
ject, there should be righteousness; between husband and wife, there
should be respective duties; between the elder and the younger,
there should be order; between friends, there should be sincerity."",
The dominance of 1i in the Chinese law of treaties was mani-
fested when China was forced to enter the modem family of nations.
The Chinese of the mid-nineteenth century viewed the 1842 Sino-
British Treaty of Nanking, 20 known as the Wan-nien Ho-yiieh (the
Peace Treaty of Ten Thousand Years), as unalterable and forever
17. Duke Hsiiang, bk. VII, yr. IV, in 5 CHINESE CLASSICS, supra note 16, at 296.
18. Duke Hsiang, bk. IX, yr. IX, in 5 CHINESE CLASSICS, supra note 16, at 441.
19. Mencius, bk. III, pt. I, ch. 4, § 8, in 2 CHINESE CLASSICS, supra note 16, at
251-52.
20. 30 BRITISH mNm FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 389 (1841-42).
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valid. The Tsungli Yamen wrote in 1867 that once an item enters
into a treaty, every word of it becomes ironclad.21 Li Hung-chang
was convinced that once a treaty had been ratified, nothing could
be done to change it.22  Even the xenophobic monarch, Emperor
Hsien-feng, did not unilaterally abrogate any treaty. The closest
he came to doing so was to encourage the obstructionist tactics and
tendencies of his Canton viceroy, Yeh Ming-ch'en, and the Canton
populace.23
Li continues to be a strong influence in modern China, in both
interpersonal and interstate relations. Specific rules of conduct de-
creed by the government and constituting fa continue to be domi-
nated by li. Li and fa are two of the major religious concepts that
have become ingrained in the Chinese legal system. They are not,
however, the only religious ideas to have affected that system. This
Article now turns to a consideration of other important religious con-
cepts that originated not from Confucian or Legalist tradition but
from Buddhism as it developed in China.
The Buddhist Concept of Law
The Buddhist tradition constitutes the third major legal tradi-
tion in China. As a religion seeking liberation from samsdra (re-
birth), Buddhist legalism is not legalism in the usual sense of the
word. This section of the Article focuses, not on the internal struc-
ture of Buddhist law, but on the general Buddhist concept of "law"
and its historical consequences in China. We focus on the concept
in order to reveal the ethos of Buddhism and the spirit of its rational
life style.
2 4
Levels of Law in Buddhism
Buddhism is, strictly speaking, the Buddha-Dharma, the Law of
the Buddha. Law is only one meaning of the word "dharma," which
also means truth, virtue, righteousness, and duty. The word "dhar-
ma" is rooted in rta, the cosmic norm followed by the Aryans who
21. Hsu, CHINA'S ENTRANCE INTO THE FAMILY OF NATIONS 6 (1960).
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. The schematization will lend some clarity to law in Buddhism although it
might not do justice to all the finer aspects in this tradition.
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invaded India and founded the Brahmanical culture. In Hinduism,
dharma oversees the society and therefore encompasses the duties
of caste. When the Buddha discovered the dharma (truth) he un-
derstood it outside, the caste context. His teaching is referred to
as Buddha-Dharma, the Law of the Enlightened One. Correspond-
ing to the Greek logos or the Chinese Tao, dharma is both the correct
and the actual norm of the universe. Dharma is reality and truth.
Inasmuch as the truth is embodied in his teachings (dharma25 ), the
Buddha-Dharma is truth itself. In Christian thought, Jesus Christ
is seen as the logos personified. Similarly, in Mahayana, the Buddha
is said to be the dharma, and all Buddhas, enlightened ones, are one
in the Dharmakdya, the Law-body.
The Chinese were converts to the Buddha-Dharma beginning
some time in the first century A.D. A consensus was soon reached
to translate the Sanskrit term to "fo-fd': fo stood for the Buddha,
and fa, for the dharma. Although it may appear peculiar that the
Buddhists would settle on the word fa (law) in the face of the tra-
ditional Confucian stigma against law and against the Legalist, at
that time the term "fa" had a more general meaning than law. Fa
connoted method and therefore teaching or school. It thus func-
tioned to convey the law as well as the teachings of the Buddha in
the translation. Fa may also mean model, pattern, or, perhaps in
Mohist usage, 26 shared characteristics. Thus, Lao-tzu's Tao-te-ching
at one point says:
Man patterns (fa) after Heaven.
Heaven patterns (fa) after Tao.
Tao patterns (fa) after Nature.
27
The word fa (pattern) conveys the sense of cosmic pattern which
is also basic to the word dharma. The choice was therefore not le-
galistic.
The Development of the Legal Institution: Sila and Vinaya
Sila (precepts) and vinaya (disciplines, monastic rules) corre-
spond most closely to law in the Buddhist tradition. The Buddha
25. Dharma in the sense of a personal "teaching" is a Buddhist innovation.
26. Tao also had the meaning of "way," "teaching," "school."
27. LAo--zu, TAo-T -cHaNG, ch. 25.
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set down for the lay congregation the five basic precepts, pahicasla.28
The novice (Aramana) follows, in addition, five more kias. Vinaya
is the monastic code designed specifically for the full monk. It grew
out of the early fortnight confessions, prdtimoksa, when the brethren
would publically confess their transgressions. The Chinese term for
vinaya was "li" (regulations), a legal term. The mature legal sys-
tem known as lii-ling, "regulations and commands," evolved in the
seventh century. Lid pertains to administrative regulations or de-
crees; ling pertains specifically to commands or orders from above.
Li-ling became the general term for legal code. One Japanese
scholar has speculated that the Buddhist institution of l and its cor-
responding mentality might have influenced the T'ang creation of
an objective, bureaucratically more efficient administrative and legal
system.
29
The Buddhist ii was introduced into China relatively late. Com-
prehensive awarness of lii began in the fifth century. The Chinese
probably never adopted the harsh rules of a full monastic life, be-
cause most monks at that time were only ramanas, barely initiates.
By the time Chinese Buddhists became familiar with the full Bud-
dhist teaching, they had created their own Ch'an (Zen) monastic
code known as ch'ing-kuei or "pure rules." Nevertheless, beginning
in the fifth century, there were identifiable masters of the vinaya
known as "lii-shih," a term now used to designate legal counsel or
jurists. Although the lii-shih in Buddhism did not approach being
modern jurists, and although their impact at that early date was
probably minimal, they may represent the first legal specialists in
China. Famous lii-shih studied more than one recension of the
prdktimoksa, compared the teachings, formulated their own inter-
pretations, and settled disputes in the monastic community. 30
Basic Legal Principles
There are different levels of law operating in the Buddha-Dharma.
The most basic one is the law of karma (action), which is accepted
28. Ahimsa (nonviolence to life) is the first rule. The other rules forbid lying,
stealing, adultery, and alcohol consumption.
29. The suggestion is that lii and ling were differentiated from the more compact
notion of fa (law) used in the Han dynasty. Due to the complexities involved in
this issue, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this Article.
30. T'ang monk, Tao-hsiin, is the acknowledged master and founder of the lii
sect. He developed rules for the Chinese monasteries patterned upon Indian pre-
cedents.
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without question by Buddhist and Hindu alike and which forms the
basis for all Indian philosophy. After the Buddha sought and found
an escape from the karmic cycles of samsdra (rebirth), he charted the
Buddhist law of causation. The Buddha believed in the rationality
of the universe, rejecting the concept that the world is structurally
adharmic or lawless. Even if the ultimate wisdom (prajifi) is not
open to rational analysis, the path (mdirga) leading to it may be
constructed. A summary of various laws appears below.
Karma
The law of karma is the law of action and reaction: all deeds
will generate, inevitably, their proper rewards and punishment wheth-
er immediately, in the next life, or in lives ahead. Karma (action,
deeds) includes all action, "good, evil or indifferent," physical or psy-
chic, overt or covert, or large or small."- Nothing falls outside the
law of karma .3 2  Karma is therefore the most general of laws. Orig-
inally, karma referred to magical actions at Brahmanical sacrificial
rites, 33 but during the period of socal chaos and instability around
the sixth century B.C., its meaning was expanded to include all actions.
The Buddha, furthermore, uncovered the power of latent actions
(actions unperformed) and recognized the centrality of citta-karma,
the karma of the mind. Just as the religious principles of Jesus em-
phasized that sin could be committed in the heart, the Buddha's
doctrine also underlined the perilous nature of the mind. Both re-
ligious founders introduced a new "ethics of motivation" into what
previously had been predominantly an ethics of consequence. Jesus
said that a man who lusted in his heart had already committed adul-
tery. Buddha was certain that good and evil follow faithfully from
the actions of the mind.34
31. This theory of action is much more comprehensive than the Western concept
of moral action. Even the ethically neutral movement of a blank thought constitutes
karma that will generate a minute momentum toward one's rebirth.
32. More accurately, nothing in the material world falls outside the laws of karma.
Transcendental realities like nirvana or Buddha-Dharma may fall outside this domain.
33. This meaning of karma appeared in the Vedic Brahmanas (priestly lore) prior
to the time of the Buddha.
34. The opening verse of the popular Dharmapada speaks of good and evil, fol-
lowing closely upon the mind like the track and the wheel of a cart. Also, both in
Christianity and in Buddhism, will or samskara becomes a new focus of moral concern
in matters of salvation or enlightenment.
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Historically, religious concern about ethics of motivation usually
led to a rational and critical review of traditional morals. Lore,
custom, and taboo which constituted law or part of the sacred law
before were refined, redefined, or rewritten by the resulting moral
criticism. The early Christian church, for example, challenged He-
braic rules of dietary cleanliness. The Buddha, too, rejected old
ideas about caste uncleanliness, opening his fellowship to the ,'i-dra,
the lowest caste, and to women. This focus on ethics of motivation
perhaps also led to a redefinition of the Chinese concept of legal re-
sponsibility. Sharper distinctions were made between the intent to
do evil, actions committed with intent, and acts committed mindless-
ly or accidentally. This distinction was a clear advance beyond the
innocent guilt and subsequent punishment that previously was vis-
ited upon an unaware taboo-breaker.35  Above all, a culture influ-
enced by ethics of motivation insists on personal responsibility. A
person will not be punished for sins committed by a brother. So,
too, the Buddha emphasized that a person is a Brahmin not by birth
but only because of his actions and present virtue. Birth (ascrip-
tion) is secondary to merit (achievement). Karma in Buddhist un-
derstanding is therefore not passive fate; to resign oneself to karmic
fate is in fact a sin in Buddhist thought.36
The Buddha emphasized free will and karmic consequence. In
the earlier tradition, preserved in Theravdda (Hinayana), karma was
entirely individualistic and could not be transferred. 3i Each man
was required to earn his salvation by his own actions. This idea
was fairly alien to China because even the Taoist community had the
idea that the sins or the blessings of ancestors would visit upon and
be borne by their children38 Similarly, Chinese familism could not
free itself from communal responsibility. Only the Legalist tried
to insist on strict personal responsibility, at the same time preserving
the idea of guilt by association. The impact the Buddhist empha-
35. For a comprehensive treatment of this issue, see P. RICOEt., THE SYMBOLISM
OF EVIL (1967).
36. Thus, there is both active karma and passive karma, depending on emphasis.
and the Buddhist tradition is highly critical of the latter, referring to it as the "poison"
of indolence or lassitude.
37. Mdhkyna modifies this with the notion that one pays for one's own sins but
works for the good of all.
38. This concept is called "carrying the burden" in the T'ai-p'ing-ching and is
comparable to the concept of nemesis in Greek myth and drama. Both boon and bur-
den sent down by ancestors may undermine the ideal of individual responsibility.
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sis on individual responsibility had upon the Chinese notion of justice
and the legal system in the medieval period is difficult to ascertain.
Buddhism did not appear to change much of the traditional practice
of assigning liability on the basis of responsibility, a practice that was
most severe in cases of crime against the state.39
The shortcomings of the ethics of motivation arise precisely be-
cause of the subjective nature of such ethics. Pushed to its extreme,
this ethic would make the administration of justice in society impos-
sible. No judge can charge and sentence all men who lust in their
hearts on the grounds that they have, thereby, committed adultery.
A monk's concern about any unbecoming thought, however minute
or private, should not be duplicated into a society's paranoia about
hidden evils. In contrast, laws based on the ethics of consequence,
tend to allow greater privacy to the individual because only those
of his actions that have public consequence will be judged. Ethics
of motivation generated in the puritan West and in the Neo-Confu-
cian China regrettable witch-hunts seeking to control and punish
private behavior. The moral common law of the people made life
difficult for many people.
In India the law of karma was wedded to Buddha's concept of
andtman (no-self, no-soul, no-actor). The philosophical contradic-
tion of insisting on moral retribution while denying the reality of
a self was more acute in India than in China. The harshness of
this contradiction was mit;gated by the Chinese acceptance of the
doctrine of an immortal soul that transmigrates from one life to an-
other. This development was attributable to the Confucianist em-
phasis on morality and to the Taoist emphasis on immortality of the
spirit. In India, the evil of a socially reprehensible deed may be
counteracted by the practice of private austerities or yoga. In Con-
fucian China, the dialectic of karma was more narrowly defined as
moral good and evil to be rewarded or punished publicly. Thus in
the Ming and Ching periods, Chinese authors produced numerous
treatises on the inevitability of moral retribution, often within this
life. These moralizing tales preached that where human justice fails,
divine justice will ultimately triumph with total impartiality. "The
net of Heaven (justice) is wide; though thinly woven, it never lets
the evildoer escape."40
39. The most severe punishment was execution "up to nine tribes (lineages)."
40. Chinese idiom. The Divine Law is thought to be supportive of, but more
July 1978] CHINESE CONCEPTIONS OF LAW 1317
One Buddhist answer to the paradox of moral retribution with-
out a lasting self is given by the formula of pratyaya or "condition."
Although there is no permanent selfhood, there are conditions that
create an everchanging self identity. The physical self does not trans-
migrate to the next life, but subtle psychic forces might. Similarly,
actions are accounted for, not by a permanent actor but by a set
of conditions permitting those of actions to arise. The classical for-
mula is the Buddhist theory of causation, pratitya-samutpdda: "when
this is present, that is present." The theory is also called "condi-
tioned co-arising" or "dependent origination." The Buddha is said
to have discovered, under the bodhi (enlightenment) tree, that when-
ever there is craving, there is suffering; whenever craving ceases to
be, there is the cessation of suffering. This law of causation is more
a law of concomitancy than a mechanical law of cause and effect.
4 1
Technically, only when the proper conditions exist, usually in the
moment just preceding the action to be analyzed, will the result oc-
cur. For example, in murder the murderous act can be committed
only when the correct conditions are present: the intent, the pres-
ence of the victim, the timeliness, and the availability of a weapon.
In theory, the Buddhist law of causation is similar to the modem
liberal theory of environmental determinism, a view that imputes
social responsibility to extrapersonal conditions, for example, a high
crime rate in the ghetto. It appears, however, that the Confucian-
ists and the Legalists never openly accepted the theory of condition
as a mitigating circumstance. The theory of yiian, when wedded to
a doctrine of no-self, would easily shift moral responsibility entirely
away from the moral agent to surrounding factors.
An understanding of conditioned co-arising can lead to a counter-
action of the law of karma. If one knows that craving leads to suf-
fering, this knowledge can free him from suffering. The Buddha,
after discovering this formula, mapped out a path of mdrga, describ-
ing the karmic chain that produced suffering in samsdra. His teach-
ing, his Law, can transcend the law of karma.42 This Law may
either depict the path to nirvdna or may, because of the Buddha's
comprehensive than, the laws of men, who are often only agents of Heaven, karma,
or Tao.
41. See Lai, Chinese Buddhist Causation Theories, 27 PHILOSOPHY EAST AND WEST
No. 3, at 241-64 (1977).
42. In Chinese and Japanese Buddhism, karma and Dharma are often set up as
opposite poles. The burden of life's karma is said to be lifted by the infinite mercy
of the Buddha-Dharma.
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great power in Mahayana, liberate the devotee through merely his
faith in the Buddha-Dharma. The latter case involves the theory
of merit transference from the Buddha to the believer and touches
upon the irrationality of grace. The more rational path is seen in
the classic program of Wla, samddhi, and praffh (precepts, medita-
tion, and wisdom). These three steps correspond to the Western
spiritual path of purification, contemplation, and illumination prac-
ticed by medieval mystics. Adherence to the precepts in combina-
tion with the practice of meditation will lead to enlightenment. This
law or path counteracts the effects of karma. Contemplation of en-
lightenment defies the rational parameters of this Article and the
supernatural laws governing the Buddha's grace and the flight of
spirit during meditation are also beyond the scope of consideration.
The vinaya (lii in our earlier discussion), however, merits further
examination.
Monastic Regulations
The lii or monastic precepts are the body of rules to which monks
should adhere. The Buddha reputedly authored or authorized this
second "basket" (division) in the tripitaka, the Buddhist "three-
basket" canon in Theravada. The Buddha, in rejecting the caste
duties and founding his own community, outlined these communal
laws and regulations. Different sects have slightly different versions
of the basic 250.43 The vinaya governs both personal and official
conduct of individual monks and monks-in-fellowship. The rules
are extremely detailed because they are designed to cover all conceiv-
able misdemeanors, including even the private contents of dreams.
They must have appeared at an early date because in the second
council after the death of the Buddha, such minor misdeeds as stor-
ing salt were important enough to split the community. Compared
with the monastic codes of the West or the canonical law of the
Church, the Buddhist vinaya is older and much more detailed. Its
substantial impact on Chinese culture is traced below.
The Buddha's act of establishing a semipermanent community
of sannydsins, or ascetics, was a break with the previous individual-
istic tradition of eremites. Responsible for organizing a new com-
munal life for individual hermits, the Buddha founded the sangha,
43. See C.S. PREBISH, BUDDHIST MONASTIC DIscIpLIEs: THE SANSERIT PR;LTI-
MOKSHA. SruRAs OF THE MAHXSANGH1KA AND THE MT-LASARVXSTrViD1NS (1975).
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fellowship of monks, the first large-scale "tertiary group" beyond the
traditional family, village, and state. Custom, lore, and taboos were
pushed aside to create an atmosphere conducive to the rational search
for enlightenment.
The sangha institution, introduced into China in the fifth centu-
ry,44 was distinguishable from even the Taoist experiment in the
third century. The religious Taoists of the T'ien-shih-tao were the
first to create a tertiary group but even they accepted the Confucian-
ist commitment to the family (the primary group). In Taoism,
filial piety was affirmed as the basic precept. Filial piety was re-
jected, however, in the early Chinese sangha. The Buddha, the
bhiksu (ordained monks), and even the Aramanas (novices), as
teachers of the Dharma, were seen as more important than parents.
The community even called its members brothers, sisters, mothers,
sons, and other family appellations not unlike the primitive Church.
The rational lifestyle of the independent brotherhood may have af-
fected secular institutions. Later Zen monastic codes, without his-
torical precedent, created a previously unknown organizational abil-
ity. The Zen simplicity in lifestyle, its devotion to task (kungfu).
and its faithful reverence toward teachers (regarded as living Bud-
dhas) influenced the Neo-Confucians. The Neo-Confucian private
academies were, like monasteries, removed from the secular world.
Rules governing student life and master-disciple relationship were
sparklingly clear, concise and structured so as to be spiritually edify-
ing. The members of those academies then produced, from the 12th
century on, popular family laws, bureaucratic codes of behavior, and
the moralizing treatises.
45
The vinaya was regarded as the word of the Buddha, on the
same level of sacredness as the sfttra.4 For perhaps the first time
in Chinese history, there was a code that was inviolable because no
man, not even the precept-master, was above the law. The serious-
ness of the rules of the vinaya can best be illustrated by the example
of Hui-yiian. This gentry monk died after refusing to take any medi-
cine containing alcohol, a forbidden substance.
The vinaya inculcated the ideal of uniformity and equality be-
fore the law. This ideal is contrary to the Confucian li, ritual pro-
44. About three centuries after the initial acceptance of the siutras.
45. In their detailed regulations, puritanical overtones, rigidity, and evangelical
zeal, the Neo-Confucianists seem to have been indebted to the Buddhists.
46. The same claim is not made by the Christian monastic codes.
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priety, which recognizes grades of deference and addresses itself pri-
marily to the cultured classes. According to Confucian thought, the
common people should not be bound or burdened by the decorum
and etiquette of the gentlemen. The Buddhist spirit of law is also
contrary to the Legalist tradition. The Legalist desires total objec-
tivity in law and dreams of a country ruled automatically by clear,
understandable decrees. Notwithstanding this dream, the Legalist
must cater to the wishes of the king who is above the law. Legalist
fa is also positive law, changeable at will and dependent on power
and craft of the ruler, who is the ultimate source of the definitions
of right and wrong. In contrast, the law of the Buddha, created by
a man, is neither arbitrary nor coercive. Anchored in the transcen-
dental dharma. the vinaya is impersonal and therefore objective.47
Designed for sannydsins brought together in a fraternity, the vinaya,
unlike Canon Law, is nonhierarchial and insists on obedience to the
letter of the law and not, as in Christian monasticism, personal obedi-
ence to the superior or abbot. Only in Zen monasteries is the master
seen as a living Buddha, a representative in the unbroken transmis-
sion of the dharma and, therefore, one who may flout the rules for
expedient purposes.
Autonomy is the goal the vinaya seeks to inculcate because the
goal of the Law of the Buddha is not justice but discipline, especial-
ly self-discipline. Self-discipline is the implicit goal in any yoga,
the art of perfect self-control. The Chinese term to describe this is
tzu-lii, self-regnlation. This ideal may be new in view of the Con-
fucianist belief in li, an interpersonal and societal standard, although
Confucianism does insist on introspection. The Neo-Confucianists,
who came after the Buddhist era, stressed, even more, the indepen-
dence of spirit. Confucianists, however, also trust in te, the virtue
and the power of sages and illustrious ancestors. Te exerts an al-
most magical influence upon their fellow men.48  The ideal of self-
regulation, or tzu-lii, was foreign also to the Legalist way of think-
ing. In the Legalist-Taoist outlook, law, fa, may be self-regulating
to such a degree that the king could withdraw into wu-wei, nonac-
tion. Legalist fa insists on fear of punishment as a basic prerequi-
site to law-abidance and utilizes coercion to get its way. The Legal-
47. Compare the impersonal Torah of the Jewish religion as the word of God and
the subjective Grace sought by Christians through the person of Christ.
48. The Buddha, however, is comparable in this incidence to the sages te; and
monks are thought to generate waves of friendliness in the world.
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ist would not accept Buddha's last instruction: "Be a lamp unto
thyself; strive on in diligence." The idea of autonomy for the people
suggests to the Legalist only anarchy and lawlessness.
The foregoing discussion illustrates the ascetic rationality in the
Buddha-Dharma. Despite Buddhism's otherworldly goal (nirvdna)
and the transrationality of prajfid (wisdom), the Buddhist believes
in a structured universe and a structured lifestyle.
Sociological Impact of the Buddha-Dharma
The Buddha-Dharma, which calls a person to leave family and
home to join the san gha and seek enlightenment, created the first
real tension between a church and the Chinese state. Loyalty to
the Buddha was incompatible with the Confucian and Legalist ideal
of "one king, one ideology." The Confucian concept of state is pa-
ternalistic; the king is theoretically replaceable if he fails to fulfill
the moral mandate of Heaven. The Legalist idea of the state is
absolutistic; the king "owns" his domain and his subjects and is not
answerable to anyone. In the Buddhist period, there suddenly arose
in China a class of people who forsook the sacred family, pledged
a new loyalty to Buddha and declared themselves his sons, shih-tzu.
4 "
Young men reaching the age of majority, eighteen, wanted to join
the san gha as novices and become monks at twenty-one, the Bud-
dhist age of majority)70 Sfitras declared that a "master" was more
precious than parents.51 Filial piety was losing its status as the most
important virtue in the Six Dynasties.5 2  An enduring controversy
among Buddhists, Legalists and Confucianists ensued from these
conflicts.
The conflict between fo-fa, the Law of the Buddha, and wang-fa.
the Law of the King, flared up many times. The initial Buddhist
position rejected the laws of the state. It conceived of the monk
as having left home and country and having accepted the new laws
within the sattgha instead. Hui-yiian was successful in defending
49. All Chinese monks adopt Sakya, Shih, as their new clan name.
50. Buddhist vinaya recognizes human laws and would discourage the sole son of
a family, for example, from joining the fellowship.
51. See T'i-wei Po-li ching (Siitra of Trapusa and Bhallika) (recently recovered
manuscript).
52. Later, in the T'ang Dynasty, Buddhism reaffirmed this virtue. See K. CH'EN,
THE CHINESE TRANSFORMATION OF BUDDHISM 15-50 (1973).
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this position.5 3  The more liberal Mahayana followers espoused an-
other view grounded in the satrds notion that being King constituted
a contract that could be rescinded if the king was unruly. It taught
that the state existed for the common good and for the glory of the
Buddha.
San gha and state coexist in peace. The Buddhists were granted
privileges, and the monks maintained a generally apolitical profile.
The state did not intrude into the san gha's traditional rights through
legislation but expected the san gha to be a passive and ascetic com-
munity. The rights had been granted from the inception of the
monastic way of life. This broad grant of rights to the institution-
the sangha "jeweFr-rather than to the individuals-set a precedent.
Through this action the state recognized the sanctity of a separate
reality, a "City of Buddha" on earth.54 Previous to this recognition,
the Chinese emperor had only recognized the sanctity of individual
sages, holy men, and descendants of sages and had granted them
privileges out of his own free will and without undermining his claim
to absolute control. Such favors were also given in return for their
subtle contributions to the state. In granting exemption from searches
by any imperial troop to Master Lang, a Buddhist hiding in T'ai-shan,
the king still exercised this prerogative. When the king recognized
the sacredness of the sa-pgha-jewel as an institution, however, it was
a much greater concession because the charisma of the individual
was no longer relevant. Abuses of the new system proliferated, and
repeated persecution through special edicts charging the abuses be-
came the standard method of controlling the Buddhist "state within
a state." Both the Legalist and Confucanist camps recognized the
danger of the Buddhist claim to tzu-tii, or autonomy. 55 During the
sixth century in the north, the sangha actually ran its own monastic
bureaucracy alongside the civil Confucianist bureaucracy, collected
its own tax in the form of grain and administered its own justice,
except in murder cases. Not until the Tang dynasty were the temples
returned to civil control, accompanied by a decree requiring monks
to take "placement examinations."
53. Id. at 72-77.
54. The sangha is being compared to the Christian concept of the Church as the
City of God on earth.
55. The Chinese Buddhist apologists, under attack, naturally defended the com-
patibility of the Buddha-Dharma with the law of the family and the state. See K.
CH'iw, THE CHINESE TRANSFORMATION OF BUDDHIs M 65-124 (1973).
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The Mahayana community in China did have some positive in-
fluence on secular law. Compassion is a key prerequisite to the
bodhisattvic career, and in those dynasties in which the rulers were
sympathetic to Buddhism, the number of tabooed days in which be-
heading could not be done increased.56 Emperor Wu of the Liang
dynasty was famous for his leniency in this area. Mahayana encour-
aged its followers to mitigate the harshness of punishment, because
compassion required the suspension of human laws for the sake of
enlightening lost souls.
Mahayana, however, also has a concept of the End of the Law
stemming from the perceived corruption of the authentic teachings
of Buddha as a result of their transmission from men to men. This
corruption is only related to the transmission of the teachings and
not to the eternal purity of the dharma as such. In contrast to the
Hindu concept of cyclical decay and regeneration of the universe,57
Buddhists perceive only one sequence of decay interrupted by mo-
ments of revival. Different dates have been predicted for the com-
mencement of the last age. Because the degeneration of the Buddha-
Dharma means not just the decay of the doctrines, but also the na-
ture of humanity, family, state, cosmos, and universe, the arrival of
total lawlessness in this period can sometimes be met with "inten-
tional lawlessness" (flouting of all conventions) 8 and eschatological
expectations of the arrival of the Future Buddha. The Ming dynasty
was founded in expectation of the reign of Light (ming), a Manicha-
ean motif that had infiltrated Buddhism. Because of such eschato-
logical expectations, in the recent dynasties there have been repeated
uprisings among peasants whose members deny all current laws and
institutions. The political impact of this folk Buddhist discontent
registered in the mobilization of the peasant masses in the Commu-
nist revolution. This religious underground, often violent, apoca-
lyptic, and a law unto itself, was nurtured by communalistic hopes
to serve the oppressed. This late Buddhist tradition was no longer
the parasitic, withdrawn, and passive piety of the otherworldly monks.
56. See CHUi T'UNC-TSU, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRADITIONAL CHINA 15-90 (1961).
The tabooed days occur when the karma accounts are being made. They are often
determined by Chinese calendar calculations of "crisis days."
57. Hindu Dharma is cosmic, but the Buddha-Dharma is based on a historically
unrepeatable event.
58. One famous Japanese text says that laws in fact are made to be broken and
any pretense at keeping the vinaya is prideful and impossible.
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The contemporary scene may now be evaluated from the histor-
ical perspective gleaned from the preceding survey of the Buddhist
tradition.
Impact on the Present
The Buddhist "ethics of motivation," as opposed to "ethics of
consequences," is echoed in the present-day People's Republic of
China, where "thought reform" and "self-criticism" have assumed a
religious fervor. The strong note of egalitarianism in Chinese com-
munism reflects the Buddhist emphasis on universal brotherhood, on
a life of service, and on personal merit (achievement) over birth (as-
cription). Even the forsaking of families by the Red Guards recalls
the similar actions of Buddhist monks in leaving behind earthly crav-
ings and belongings. Revolutions often produce their own brand
of asceticism.
The dichotomy between ii and fa in the Chinese legal system
and the dominance of 1i over fa in the event of a conflict have con-
tinued from Imperial China through the Nationalistic era to the
People's Republic of China. In conflicts between the heavily Western-
oriented laws and Constitution of the Nationalist period and li, 1i
prevailed.59  The inheritance law is one example.60 The traditional
li would, in the interest of continuing the cult, pass everything from
a deceased father to the eldest son of the legitimate wife. Other
offspring, whether younger sons or daughters, married or unmarried,
would not have any right of succession to the patrimony, although
the deceased or his heir could relinquish a share of the hereditary
property to the heir's brothers and sisters. Under the Nationalist
Civil Code, equality of the sexes was the proclaimed policy of the
State, and all of the deceased's children, sons and daughters, married
or unmarried, were allowed equal shares of the property. Neverthe-
less, Escarra quotes the following remark, made to him by a high
Kuomintang official:
59. See Dien in China and Vietnam, 17 J. AsrAN STiUmEs 403, 411 (1958); Sugin-
chara Shn n ichi, Ten No Hotcki: Seishihtsu, 19 HoiuTsu JMo 32 (1947); McAleavy,
The People's Court (1961) (unpublished).
60. For a discussion of inheritance law in China today, see VAN DER VALK, THE
LAw OF INHEmTANCE iN EAsTnN EUOOPE AmD IN THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
(1961).
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According to law, my interlocutor told me in substance, my
wife would have the right, on the death of her father, to claim
a share of the property equal to that of her brothers.- Perhaps,
according to the circumstances, she would have an understanding
with them to obtain a share. But one fact is certain. That is,
that she will never exercise her right (although it is inscribed in
the Code) and that I will never permit her to plead on this point.
For in so doing I should act contrary to the rites and I, as well
as my wife, should have against me the unanimous disapproval
of public opinion.61
It is important to realize that the content of 1i is not immutable.
Just as Han Fei-tze, founder of the Legalist School, had no monopoly
over the specific rules of fa, so Confucius could not dictate the con-
tent of 1i for all generations to come. Li, in a broad sense, may be
interpreted as custom that has acquired the force of law, character-
ized by moral teachings, the use of persuasion, the appeal to reason
and good sense, and the exemplification of good conduct and be-
havior. Its metamorphosis into law depends upon its widespread
and unvaried acceptance by society, but its specific content may
change with the times. Just as customary law may change over the
ages, so some rules of li, appropriate in Confucius' time, may not be
relevant in the twentieth century. Anyone able to instill a new 1i
into the spirit and mind of the people would succeed in remolding the
social behavior of millions in the same way Confucianism has done
in the past. The Kuomintang had the San-Min-Chu-162 and the New
Life Movement but, for a variety of reasons, their goals remained
unfulfilled.
The guiding spirit of Chinese Communist Law is Maoism, the
new 1i which replaced the Confucian li. Fully aware of the danger
of a discrepancy between fa and the new li, the Communist Party,
renowned for its mass organizational ability, mobilized all the human
resources at its disposal-party members, cadres, and students-to re-
shape public opinion into accepting the Communist 1i based on Mao's
New Democracy. Mass meetings were convened and study groups
formed for the purpose of re-educating the people. Furthermore,
61. ESCARMA, supra note 1, at 31.
62. The San-min Chu-I were the Three Principles of the People: Nationalism,
Democracy, and the People's Livelihood. Formulated by Dr. Sun Yat-sen around
1905, these three principles formed the dogma of the Kuomintang which Sun Yat-sen
founded.
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the promulgation of important laws, including the 1954 Constitution
and the Marriage Law of 1951, was preceded by intense public dis-
cussion and debate, and the public was invited to make comments
and suggestions.0 Although it appears that basic policies and doc-
trines are predetermined by the Communist Party, there is always
room for a change on a technical level. There is no doubt that such
measures have been instrumental in giving the public a sense of iden-
tity with the new legislation and thus in bridging the gap between
the Communist 1i and fa.
When a conffict does exist, the Chinese Communists have not
hesitated to follow the centuries-old tradition of elevating 1i over
fa. For example, despite the guarantee of religious freedom in ar-
ticle 88 of the Constitution of the People's Republic of China, such
freedom is at best restrictively interpreted and at worst severely im-
paired because of its incompatibility with dialectical materialism.
In addition, article 78 of the Constitution, providing that courts must
be guided by law alone when deciding cases, is designed to ensure
judicial independence, but this provision for independence has been
construed to mean that courts must follow national policy, must be
controlled and supervised by the people, and must be in harmony
with local governmental activities. 64  A third example of the pre-
dominance of 1i over fa is the vestigial nature of article 10 of the
Constitution, which guarantees capitalists the right of ownership of
the means of production, and of article 87, which guarantees freedom
of speech, publication, assembly, association, procession, demonstra-
tion and the Government's material assistance in their implementa-
tion.
A question may be raised concerning the compatibility of China's
habit of elevating 1i over fa with its meticulous observance of treaty
obligations, even those which conffict with Chinese principles of
justice and equity.65  Cynics may attribute this apparent inconsist-
ency to temporary military expediency in the face of the overwhelm-
ing nuclear superiority of the United States and the Soviet Union.
63. See Mizuno, The Judicial System, in CmroKu NO HO TO SHAKAI 51 (1959)
(Report of the Japanese jurist's mission to China); id. passim.
64. WEr WEN-PO, Tui-yu "CHUNG-HUA JEN-MIN KUNG-HO-KUO JEN-MIN FA-YUAN
Tsu-sHx-FA" CHI-PEN WF-T'r TE JEN-CHJH 7 (1956).
65. See L.T. LEE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS (1969); Lee, Treaty
Relations of the People's Republic of China: A Study of Compliance, 116 U. PA. L.
REv. 244 (1967).
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The teaching of Confucius may, however, shed some light on this
question.
The last of the five relationships which dominate Confucian so-
ciety is the relationship between friends, a relationship characterized
by sincerity. This trusting relationship is based on equality. It is
the one that diplomatic relations most closely resemble, governed
as they are by Pacta sunt servanda or good faith-the equivalent of
sincerity on the interstate level. A discussion of the contrast be-
tween China's relations with North Korea and those with Tibet may
illustrate the validity of the above analogy.
The suzereign-vassal relationship that has traditionally existed
between China and Tibet may be analogized to the relationship be-
tween an elder and younger brother in a Confucian society, rather
than that between a sovereign and a subject or between friends.
Because brotherly relations in a Confucian society call for a strict
maintenance of order, the rights and duties between brothers tran-
scend mere observance of agreements. Thus, regardless of the per-
sonal preference of a younger brother, the elder brother has, in the
interest of the family, certain obligations toward him which cannot
be shirked without violating the Confucian code of conduct. Trans-
formed into the international sphere, this duty might form the basis
for Peking's institution of land reform and other programs in Tibet,
notwithstanding the provisions of article 11 of the Sino-Tibetan
agreement of 1951 against the use of compulsion on the part of the
central authorities to effect reforms. 66
66. The legal relationship of Tibet to China dates from the 13th century when
Kublai Khan, a Mongol Emperor of China, ceded temporal authority over Tibet to the
Dalai Lamas, and continued through the Manchu dynasty and the Republican era to
the 1951 Agreement of the Central People's Government and the Local Government
of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet. For an English translation
of the Agreement, see A.L. STRONc, TIBETAN INTERVIEWS 200-05 (1959). For further
discussion of Sino-Tibetan relations, see INTERNATIONAL COIMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE
QUESTION OF TIBET AND THE RULE OF LAW (1959); A. LAMB, THE CHINA-INDIA BOR-
DER (1964); Alexandrowicz, Comment on the Legal Position of Tibet, 5 INDIAN YEAR
BOOK OF INT'L AFFAIRS 172-73 (1956); Green, Legal Aspects of the Sino-Indian Border
Dispute, CHINA Q., at 43 (July-Sept. 1960); Rubin, A Matter of Fact, 59 AM. J.
INT'L L. 586 (1965); Rubin, The Position of Tibet in International Law, CHINA Q.
No. 35 at 110 (July-Sept. 1968); Sharma, The India-China Border Dispute: An Indian
Perspective, 59 AM. J. INT'L L. 16 (1965); Tieh-Tseng Li, The Legal Position of Tibet,
50 Am. J. INT'L L. 394 (1956). Neither India nor the United States, nor, indeed, any
state, has recognized Tibet as anything other than Chinese territory.
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In the case of Korea, however, its centuries-old, vassal-suzereign
relationship with China was terminated by the Sino-Japanese War
of 1895. It was formally annexed by Japan in 1910 and, after World
War II, it became divided but independent. Korean relations with
China have resumed as those between friends in a Confucian society,
characterized by sincerity. This turn of events might explain Pe-
king's meticulous compliance with promises made to North Korea, in-
cluding that concerning the withdrawal of Chinese troops in 1958.7
Because of the predominance of ii over fa, the study of Chinese
law must be all-embracing. To a much greater extent than is true
of Western law, it must include the study of philosophy, religion,
classics, history, politics, economics, sociology, and psychology. Pre-
occupation with scrutinizing, analyzing, and comparing statutes and
court decisions-a skill that Western lawyers employ with dexterity
and felicity-is futile and misleading 8 because such an approach,
devoid of insight into the makeup of Chinese society, would at best
deal with symptoms and not causes. Yet the mastery of the Chinese
language, let alone the mastery of the Chinese culture, is a life-long
process for non-Chinese. Although the efforts of a few American
universities to initiate Chinese legal studies and a few law professors
who have begun the study of the Chinese language serve as encour-
agement, the tasks ahead are arduous and full of pitfalls.
67. See L.T. LEE, CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 46-58 (1969).
68. See Lee, Book Review, 12 Am. J. CoMP. L. 606-09 (1963).
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